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Abstract
By filtering out the philosophic component we can be said that
the EPR-paper was directed against the straightforward interpreta-
tion of the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle or more generally the
Bohr’s complementarity principle. The latter expresses contextuality
of quantum measurements: dependence of measurement’s output on
the complete experimental arrangement. However, Bell restructured
the EPR-argument against complementarity to justify nonlocal theo-
ries with hidden variables of the Bohmian mechanics’ type. Then this
Bell’s kind of nonlocality - subquantum nonlocality - was lifted to the
level of quantum theory - up to the terminology “quantum nonlocal-
ity”. The aim of this short note is to explain that Bell’s test is simply
a special test of local incompatibility of quantum observables, similar
to interference experiments, e.g., the two-slit experiment.
1 Introduction
In this note I repeat the message presented in papers [1]-[3]. This
note was motivated by the recent INTERNET discussion on the Bell
inequality. This discussion involved both sides: those who support the
conventional interpretation of a violation of the Bell type inequalities
and those who present a variety of non-conventional positions. As
always happens in such discussions on the Bell inequality, the diversity
of for and against arguments was really amazing, chaotic, and mainly
misleading.1 My attempt to clarify the situation by replying R. Gill
1I (as well as R. Gill and T. Nieuwenhuizen) participate in similar discussions since
year 2000 and the situation did not change so much. It is interesting that the recent
1
generated a new burst of chaos. In parallel, I had the email exchange
with W. De Muynck and his sharing my views on the Bell inequality
interpretation stimulated me to write this note (with hope to stop
further misinterpreting of the Bell inequality).
The aim of this short note is to explain that Bell’s test is simply a
special test of local incompatibility of quantum observables, similar to
interference experiments, e.g., the two slit experiment. In particular,
Bell’s test has nothing to do with nonlocality, neither subquantum nor
quantum. I guess that the fathers of the Copenhagen interpretation,
e.g., Bohr and Heisenberg, would not be interested in such a test since
the principle of complementarity was well supported by interference
experiments.
The main message of this paper is presented in a few words and
formulas in the next section. Only the readers who are deeply in-
volved into quantum foundations can be interested in the discussions
presented in appendixes.2
2 CHSH inequality is violated only un-
der the condition of local incompatibil-
ity
The mathematical counterpart of the story which I plan to tell is well
known and rather trivial. The main issue is the interpretation. Here
we proceed by using mathematics from article [4]. This article is based
on the quantum formalism (cf., e.g., [1] - [3], [5]-[8]). 3
Consider the Bohm-Bell type experiments. There are considered
four observables A1, A2, B1, B2 taking values ±1. It is assumed that
the pairs of observables (Ai, Bj), i, j = 1, 2, can be measured jointly,
(2015) loophole free experiments did not have any impact on “non-conventional” part of
discussants. But A. Aspect told me around year 2000 that closing loopholes would not
close the foundational discussion.
2 Appendix 1 (coupling the EPR-argument and the Bohr’s complementarity principle,
Bohr’s reply to Einstein) and in Appendix 2 (the contextual nature of the Bohr’s principle
of complementarity, so to say the principle of contextuality-complementarity), Appendix 3
(the role of the existence of the irreducible quantum of action, the Planck constant).
3The direct appeal to the quantum formalism makes the presentation clearer for so
to say “real physicists”. Suppose I met a physicist who is not so much interested in
quantum foundations, who believes in the validity of quantum theory and its completeness,
following, for example, Bohr, Heisenberg, Fock, Landau, and who is not interested in
anything “beyond quantum mechanics”. Suppose he asked me: “What does a violation of
the Bell’s inequality mean?” He is not interested in an answer related to hidden variables,
or foundations of probability theory.
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i.e., A-observables are compatible with B-observables. However, the
observables in pairs A1, A2 and B1, B2 are incompatible, i.e., they
cannot be jointly measured. Thus probability distributions pAiBj are
well defined theoretically by quantum mechanics and they can be ver-
ified experimentally; probability distributions pA1A2 and pB1B2 are
not defined by quantum mechanics and, hence, the question of their
experimental verification does not arise.
For spatially separated systems S1 and S2, incompatibility of the
A-observables on S1 and the B-observables on S2 is natural to call
local incompatibility
Now we proceed generally, i.e., without the local incompatibility
assumption. In the quantum formalism observables are presented by
Hermitian operators which will be denoted by the same symbols as the
observables. The quantum representation of the CHSH-correlations
can be obtained with the aid of the “CHSH-operator”:
C =
1
2
[A1(B1 +B2) +A2(B1 −B2)]. (1)
As was shown in article [4], for given observables, the CHSH inequality
holds for all quantum states iff
C2 ≤ I, (2)
where I is the unit operator.
It is easy to show that
C2 = 1 + (1/4)[A1, A2][B1, B2]. (3)
Thus if at least one of the commutators equals to zero, i.e.,
[A1, A2] = 0, (4)
or
[B1, B2] = 0, (5)
then the CHSH inequality holds for all quantum states. It is impossi-
ble to violate this inequality, if at least at one side (say at the A-side)
observables are compatible. We emphasize that both these conditions
are local. Condition (4) is about observables on system S1 and con-
dition (4) is about observables on system S2. (How can one find any
trace of nonlocality here?)
3 Conclusion
In the light of the previous consideration, it is clear that the common
claim that the Bell story about nonlocality is really misleading. (Any
3
rationally thinking expert in quantum foundations should dismiss the
use of the term “nonlocality”.) The Bell-tests are just special tests of
incompatibility. The natural question arises:
Do the Bell type experiments add some foundational value to the
interference type experiments?
Thus if one hope to go beyond quantum mechanics, then he should
search for possible violations of the complementarity principle. How-
ever, such experiment have nothing to do with spatial separation of
systems.
Appendix 1: The role of complemen-
tarity principle in the EPR-reasoning
I start with the remark that one has to separate the Bell inequality as
the mathematical result and its interpretation, including conditions
of its derivation. So, there is no problem with the “Bell theorem”,
the problem is the conventional interpretation of this mathematical
statement. Thus people who claim that they found mistakes in Bell’s
mathematics do very bad job for quantum foundations: they discredit
the rational critique of the conventional interpretation of the Bell in-
equality.
The second important remark is that using the notion “local re-
alism” in interpreting violations of the Bell type inequalities is really
misleading. It seems that Bell have never used this notion. At least in
his book [9], the collection of his main works, “local realism” appears
only in the title of the reference to the of one philosopher.
Bell started his project as being on the realist position [9] (by fol-
lowing directly the EPR-paper [10]). Then he claimed that realism can
be saved only through the rejection of locality. Finally, he understood
that
“the result of an observation may reasonably depend not only upon
the state of the system (including the hidden variables) but also on the
complete disposition of the apparatus” [11].
Shimony [12] stressed that this is the first statement about con-
textuality (although Bell did not use this terminology):
“John Stewart Bell (1928-90) gave a new lease on life to the program
of hidden variables by proposing contextuality. In the physical example just
considered the complete state λ in a contextual hidden variables model would
indeed ascribe an antecedent element of physical reality to each squared spin
component s2
n
but in a complex manner: the outcome of the measurement of
4
s2
n
is a function s2
n
(λ,C) of the hidden variable λ and the context C, which
is the set of quantities measured along with s2
n
. ... a minimum constraint on
the context C is that it consist of quantities that are quantum mechanically
compatible, that is represented by self-adjoint operators which commute with
each other. ...”
However, this is nothing else as Bohr’s statement that measure-
ment’s output depends on the complete experimental arrangement (see
Appendix 2). In principle, there is just one step from understanding of
the role of such type of contextuality t o Bohr’s complementarity prin-
ciple and to understanding that violations of the Bell-type inequalities
is a consequence of this principle (Appendix 2). Unfortunately, Bell
was addicted to the nonlocality issue and this final step has never been
done.
One may say that Bohr did not consider the possibility to go be-
yond the quantum theory, e.g., by introducing hidden variables. As
I learned from Arkady Plotnitsky who is the author of a series of
monographs about Bohr, the complementarity principle, and the in-
terpretations in the Spirit of Copenhagen (see, e.g., [13, 14] and our
joint paper [15]), in principle Bohr did not reject the possibility of
construction of mathematical subquantum models. He was not ex-
cited by mathematical no-go theorems. For him the possibility to go
beyond quantum theory was blocked by the principle of complemen-
tarity. Some people think that the latter is a purely philosophical
principle. However, for Bohr and other Copenhagenists, this principle
was a physical principle such as Newton laws (see Appendix 2).
Bell’s behavior has its root in the EPR-paper [10] in that the anti-
complementarity issue was covered by the “philosophic souse” with
“elements of reality” as its basic component. Let us clean the EPR-
argument from the “philosophic souse”. Such a rafined argument has
the following structure:
• The Copenhagen interpretation is heavily based on the comple-
mentarity principle.4
• This principle was (straightforwardly) interpreted as the rejec-
tion of the joint existence of the position and momentum of a
quantum system.
• The existence of the EPR-states exhibiting perfect correlations
contradicts to the complementarity principle.
The natural conclusion from the EPR-argument could be formulated
as follows:
4It seems that in the EPR-paper it was identified with Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple. But at that time such identification was common.
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Bohr’s principle of complementarity should be rejected!
However, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen combined the above rea-
soning on physical foundations of quantummechanics with philosophic
argumentation based on the elements of reality. The above conclusion
was not clearly stated in [10].
This is the good place to mention the Bohr reply [16] to the EPR-
paper. During conferences on quantum foundations, speakers perma-
nently say that it is impossible to understand Bohr’s paper. I do not
think so. The message of this paper is very clear:
The principle of complementarity is not about the joint existence.
It is about the possibility of joint measurement!
In any event, Bell did not understand the Bohr reply and tried to
justify the EPR-argument by using subquantum mathematical mod-
els of the hidden variables type. As was already stressed, ignoring
the crucial role played by the complementarity principle in the EPR-
paper led him to the emphasis of nonlocality. We recall that in the
EPR-paper [10] nonlocality was mentioned as an absurd alternative to
incompleteness of quantum mechanics. (And we interpret the latter
as the possibility to violate the complementarity principle.)
Appendix 2: Bohr’s complementarity
principle as a principle of contextuality
Bohr’s complementarity principle is not just a kind of the impossibility
principle. In the modern terminology the essence of the complemen-
tarity principle is contextuality. But Bohr by himself did not operate
with the notion “experimental context”; he wrote about experimental
conditions [17]:
“Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
and electrodynamics merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of
expectations pertaining to observations obtained under well-defined experi-
mental conditions specified by classical physical concepts.”
We now present the basic futures of Born’s principle of contextuality-
complementarity [18]:
• (B1): There exists the fundamental quantum of action given by
the Planck constant h.
• (B2): The presence of h prevents approaching internal features
of quantum systems.
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• (B3): Therefore it is meaningless (from the viewpoint of physics)
to build scientific theories about such features.
• (B4): An output of any observable is composed of contributions
from a system under measurement and the measurement device.
• (B5): Therefore the complete experimental arrangement (con-
text) has to be taken into account.
• (B6): There is no reason to expect that all experimental contexts
can be combined. Therefore there is no reason to expect that all
observables can be measured jointly. This is the essence of the
principle of complementarity. Hence, there exist incompatible
observables.
We emphasize that the principle (B6) is just a consequence of (B4)
and (B5). And Bohr understood the complementarity principle as the
combination of (B1-B6). It is the good place to remark that statement
(B6) is very natural in any experimental situation. The existence of
incompatible experimental contexts is not surprising. Non-existence
would be really surprising.
Unfortunately, the name “complementarity principle” led to the
common understanding of this principle as just an impossibility prt-
inciple. I think that in the light of the above consideration, the name
of Bohr’s “complementarity principle” should be changed to
The Bohr’s contextuality principle or the contextuality-complementarity
principle.
Of course, such renaming would be a delicate operation since nowa-
days the terminology “contextuality” is widely used in foundational
discussion on the Bell type inequalities. In such discussions, the mean-
ing of the notion “contextuality” does not coincide with so to say
“Bohr’s contextuality”, as taking into account the experimental con-
text to explain the mechanism of generating the values of quantum
observables. From this viewpoint, any single quantum observable is
contextual. Roughly speaking contextuality is present everywhere.
There is no need in consideration joint measurements of compatible
observables, A,B1 and A,B2, to find its exhibitions.
Appendix 3: A role of the Planck quan-
tum of action
As was already noted, the Bohr’s reasoning leading to the comple-
mentarity principle (B6) was fundamentally based on the principle
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(B1): the existence in nature of the fundamental quantum of action
given by the Planck constant h. It seems that nowadays this fun-
damental “Bohr-Planck postulate” is totally forgotten. I have not
seen any its trace in nowadays foundational discussions on the com-
plementarity principle. Moreover, the Planck constant is not present
at all in modern discussions: neither the Bell’s type no-go theorems
nor theorems on “quantum contextuality” do not containn h (nor the
Kochen-Specker theorem). I think that the essence of the complemen-
tarity principle (and hence the role of the EPR-counterargument) can
be understood only through the careful analysis of the Bohr-Planck
postulate. Such an analysis with attraction of new ideas can be done
only by real physicist. The mathematical games around no-go the-
orem would not help so much. In principle, we cannot exclude that
Bohr was wrong and the existence of the fundamental quantum of
action does not imply contextuality-complementarity. However, if he
were right, then, as we have seen in section 2, all manipulations with
classical probabilistic constraints have not so much relation to physics.
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